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Abstract. The growth of constitutional democracy has been a remarkable feature of the 
last thirty years, but during the last decade it has suffered a dramatic decline. That decline 
is marked less by constitutional democracies being overthrown than by an increase in 
regimes that retain the formal institutional trappings while flouting the norms and values 
on which constitutional democracies are based. This process of constitutional 
degradation is the subject of two recent books that together present the most 
comprehensive evaluation available on the current state of constitutional democracy. In 
this review article, the findings and analysis presented in Graber, Levinson, and 
Tushnet’s Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? and Ginsburg and Huq’s How to Save a 
Constitutional Democracy  are examined and appraised. The article argues that solutions to 
the contemporary crisis cannot be found only by strengthening liberal institutions; to 
survive, constitutional democracy must also seek to reinvigorate its democratic 
aspirations. 
 




1. The Rise and Decline of Constitutional Democracies 
 
When in 1748 Montesquieu published his monumental work on the history of 
government, he opened up a new era of reflection and deliberation on the conditions 
under which nations are governed. Distilling the results of a scientific investigation 
stretching over more than twenty years, Montesquieu concluded that there could be no 
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ideal political constitution.1 With respect to constitutional arrangements, The Spirit of the 
Laws advanced a theory of relativity: constitutions express the history and culture of a 
people, varying in form according to particular social, economic and geographical 
conditions.  
Montesquieu’s relativity theory was further bolstered when, over the following 
century, the term ‘constitution’ acquired a new, more precise meaning. The new 
documentary constitutions adopted across Europe after Napoleon had imposed the 
French way of thinking about government, for example, were hardly struck from a single 
template; drafted according to political circumstances, they continued to exhibit 
considerable variation.2 Nor could the American Constitution be held up readily as a 
model that others might emulate. Latin American countries that during the nineteenth 
century sought to do so with such unfortunate consequences had overlooked Publius’s 
proclamation that the American Constitution had been drafted for a people ‘descended 
from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, 
attached to the same principles of government’ and ‘very similar in their manners and 
customs’.  
Scroll down 250 years, however, and one might be forgiven for thinking that 
Montesquieu’s relativity theory has since been overthrown. In the latter half of the 
twentieth century, increasing numbers of states were categorised as constitutional 
democracies and from the 1990s the growth in these numbers has been dramatic. At the 
end of the Second World War, there were only twelve established constitutional 
democracies in the world.3 By 1987 this number had grown to 66 of the world’s 193 
United Nations member states and by 2003 the 1987 figure had almost doubled to 121.4  
By the new millennium, almost every state seeking to legitimate its rule in the eyes of its 
citizens and the world felt obliged to adopt a written constitution incorporating a 
separation of powers, a commitment to the rule of law, the protection of individual 
rights, and the holding of free and fair elections. At the end of the twentieth century it 
appeared that there was only one game in town, and that game was constitutional 
democracy. 
																																																								
1 Baron Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (first published 1748. A Cohler, B Miller and H Stone trans and 
ed, CUP, 1989), xlv. 
2 John A Hopwood, Modern Constitutions since 1787 (Macmillan, 1939), ch 3.  
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As it turned out, however, the claim that the rise of constitutional democracy 
marked the end of constitutional history has proven premature. According to the 
calculations of political scientists, constitutional democracy reached its global highpoint 
in the period 2006-2011 and has since been in dramatic decline.5 This reversal has been a 
source of growing concern. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of this turnaround is 
that this decline has not been marked by constitutional democracies being overthrown by 
coup d’état or other type of fundamental collapse. Rather, it is due to an increase in the 
number of what some have called ‘defective democracies’, that is, regimes that retain the 
formal institutional trappings while flouting the norms and values on which 
constitutional democracies are based. Constitutional democracy is not being overthrown; 
it is being degraded. 
The evidence from across the world is plain. The dramatic failures of the Arab 
spring movements of 2011 – Egypt reverting to military rule, Libya, Yemen and Syria 
descending into armed conflict, and political repression deepening in the Gulf states – is 
only the most high profile instance of this decline. Of more general significance has been 
the emergence of so-called ‘illiberal democracies’ in Hungary and Poland; the growing 
electoral success of nationalist parties such as the Front National in France, the Alternative 
für Deutschland in Germany, and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). Constitutional 
values have been eroded by the increasing political influence of religious fundamentalism 
in countries like Israel, Turkey and India and by the rise to power of authoritarian 
presidential figures like Maduro in Venezuela in 2013, Duterte in the Philippines in 2016, 
Trump in the US in 2016, and in 2018 Bolsonaro in Brazil. Similarly emblematic has been 
the failure of South Africa, following the remarkable initial successes of its post-
Apartheid constitutional formation, to establish a regime of multi-party democracy. In 
2017, Freedom House, the US human rights organization, found indicators of 
democratic degradation in seventy-one countries and concluded that constitutional 
democracy was facing its most serious crisis in decades.6  
These developments have prompted three leading American constitutional 
lawyers to bring together constitutional scholars from across the world to reflect on the 
present state of affairs. Mark Graber, Sanford Levinson and Mark Tushnet’s book, 
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Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?, presents evidence across 38 chapters and drawn from 
detailed studies of particular regimes. It is a landmark account, compulsory reading for 
any student of comparative constitutional analysis. Containing a wide range of country 
studies from constitutional lawyers, it also contains multi-disciplinary investigations into 
the factors shaping the last decade of decline. The main limitation of the work, an 
inevitable consequence of the collaborative nature of this undertaking, is its tendency to 
assume that the basic characteristics and underlying values of constitutional democracy 
are self-evident. Emphasis is placed on the essential institutional features of 
constitutional democracies, but less attention is given to the changing role of 
constitutions and of the societal pre-conditions enabling constitutions to perform their 
fundamental integrative functions.  
The inquiry undertaken in the second book under review, Tom Ginsburg and 
Aziz Huq’s How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, examines the socio-institutional aspects 
of constitutional development more directly. Arguing that the form of democracy at 
work today provides ‘a façade for undemocratic behaviour’,7 they present a systematic 
account of the trends that led to the contemporary degradation of constitutional 
processes. For that purpose a minimalist definition of constitutional democracy is 
supplied, consisting of three basic elements: free elections, the recognition of basic rights, 
and the maintenance of the integrity of legal institutions.8 Ginsburg and Huq recognize 
that constitutional democracies exhibit a variety of governing arrangements, that 
degradation ‘takes many forms’ and it appears ‘in widely disparate economic, social and 
political circumstances’. 9  In seeking to establish precise institutional markers that 
facilitate measurement, comparison, and evaluation, they simplify the concept and reduce 
it to certain institutional forms. This method has evident strengths, confirmed by the 
rigour of their analysis and the acuity of their findings. But the question that looms over 
their study is whether, in simplifying for the sake of clarity, Ginsburg and Huq have 
managed to capture the ambiguities of their subject and therefore the sheer range of 
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2. Constitutional Democracy in Theory and Practice  
 
Constitutional democracy is a modern regime that expresses a principle of ‘self-
government’. For most of human history, societies have been regimented through the 
rule of emperors, monarchs and entrenched oligarchies. These regimes – autocracies of 
various types – could only be overthrown by the assertion of the right of national self-
determination. The struggle to realize this right is recent: it may have provided the 
inspiration for the late-eighteenth century American and French revolutions, but the 
practice was mainly taken up only in the twentieth century. As Ginsburg and Huq note, 
this principle of self-government demands not just the formation of governments 
through electoral contestation but also the establishment of institutional arrangements 
that ensure elections will be regular, free and fair and that basic rights to freedom of 
speech, expression and association are respected. Such institutional arrangements are 
invariably bolstered by a documentary constitution that provides checks by way of a 
separation between law-making, governmental and judicial functions.  
However necessary the institutional infrastructure that Ginsburg and Huq specify 
may be, to function well a constitutional democracy must be underpinned by certain 
social conditions. These include active civil society associations that educate and 
formulate, and strong political parties that convert diverse views into a common will. But 
above all it requires a culture that tolerates differences and recognises the need for 
restraint in the exercise of power. As John Stuart Mill put it in Representative Government, it 
requires a people ‘united among themselves by common sympathies’, sympathies that are 
propagated by identity of race and descent, community of language and religion, and the 
possession of a national history.10 Constitutional democracy is particularly well suited to 
operate in relatively homogeneous societies, that is, in small city republics of the type that 
Rousseau adopted as his standard.11  
This explanation of the social and cultural aspects of conditions for a flourishing 
constitutional democracy is important here.  Constitutional democracies which have 
rapidly been established over the last few decades, and which by common understanding 
																																																								
10 JS Mill, ‘Considerations on Representative Government’ in his Three Essays (first published, 1861. OUP, 
1975), 144 at 382. 
11 J-J Rousseau, ‘The Geneva Manuscript’ (first draft of The Social Contract, first published in 1762), in his 
The Social Contract and other later political writings  V Gourevitch trans (CUP, 1997), 153 at 158: ‘We conceive 
of the general society in terms of our particular societies, the establishment of small Republics leads us to 
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are now ‘in trouble throughout the world’, 12  do not commonly fit this template. 
Contemporary constitutional democracies are invariably populous, culturally diverse 
states with complicated histories and a wide variety of governmental arrangements. The 
term is deployed today to cover a broad range of regimes. But one can only claim that 
constitutional democracy has triumphed - thereby overturning Montesquieu’s theory of 
relativity - by adopting a formal institutional account of the term. It is the only game in 
town because its defining features are now almost as varied as the differences 
Montesquieu found between monarchies, aristocracies and democracies. 
One reason for the great variation in the character of modern constitutional 
democracies is the fundamental shift that has taken place in the function of modern 
constitutions. Invented to ensure the maintenance of limited government, constitutions 
have recently been transformed into blueprints for the good society. Initially, their task 
was to impose checks on governing institutions such that there would be no need to 
enumerate a citizen’s basic rights; governments would be obliged to respect individual 
rights by virtue of constitutional design. The amendments now known as the US Bill of 
Rights, for example, were adopted not of necessity but as concessions to alleviate certain 
concerns of the southern states.13 And later, when the inclusion of a statement of basic 
rights in written constitutions became more common, those rights expressed what were 
essentially ‘negative freedoms’, that is, rights guaranteeing a zone of individual autonomy 
free from interference by public bodies.  
Over the last fifty years, however, this classical liberal conception has been 
displaced. Far from being cordons that protect private interests from public interference, 
constitutions have become instruments for reforming the established social order. The 
first tentative steps in this shift were made by the German Federal Constitutional Court. 
In the late-1950s it interpreted its post-war constitution, the Basic Law, as ‘an order of 
objective values’ that not only permeated the entire legal system but, through its general 
radiating effect, was to shape the entire social order.14 Such developments have had a 
profound impact on constitutional consciousness, not least on the more than one 
hundred constitutions that since 1990 have been adopted across the world. It is a shift 
																																																								
12 GLT, 5. 
13 Following the adoption of the 1787 Constitution, the first session of Congress in 1789 proposed ten 
amendments which, following ratification by three-quarters of the states, in 1791 became part of the 
Constitution and are collectively known as the Bill of Rights. On the circumstances of its adoption see 
Leonard W Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights (Yale UP, 1999). 
14 See Dieter Grimm, ‘Fundamental Rights in the Interpretation of the German Constitutional Court’ in his 
Constitutionalism: Past, Present, and Future (OUP, 2016), ch 7; Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘Fundamental 
Rights as Constitutional Principles’ in his Constitutional and Political Theory: Selected Writings (OUP, 2017), ch 
10.  
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that considerably complicates the attempt to offer explanations, let alone seek remedies, 
for the contemporary crisis of constitutional democracy.  
Consider, by way of illustration, the constitution adopted by Ecuador in 2008. 
This constitution prioritises a vast array of social rights, including rights to food, water, 
health, social security, education, housing, work, and cultural identity. Further, it 
establishes extensive anti-discrimination rights with respect to ethnicity, age, sex, culture, 
civil status, language, religion, politics, sexual orientation, and disability. 15  The 
Constitution even includes the novel right to ‘integral respect for [nature’s] existence’.16 
Declaring that ‘all principles and rights are unalienable, obligatory, indivisible, 
interdependent and of equal importance’17 and that the norms of international human 
rights are immediately and directly enforceable in domestic courts, 18  Ecuador’s 
constitution requires the government to ‘adopt affirmative action measures that promote 
real equality for the benefit of the rights-bearers who are in a situation of inequality’.19  
This is a far cry from a constitution designed to bolster the established order 
through the protection of life, liberty and property. Moreover, this is not simply a 
constitution that is super-charged with enhanced rights protections. The foregrounding 
of basic rights in Ecuador’s 2008 constitution is an integral part of a reform that loosens 
institutional checks and balances. Promoted by President Correa as part of a popular 
campaign against political elites, the 2008 constitution through an exercise of what 
Weyland calls ‘discriminatory legalism’ extends discretionary presidential power at the 
expense of legislative authority.20  
What does this example reveal about the present condition of constitutional 
democracy? In the concluding chapter to Graber, Levinson and Tushnet, Graber uses 
the Ecuadorian constitution to illustrate how constitutional democracy had become 
‘thickened’ during the late twentieth century and suggests that it is model that those on 
the left in America aspire to emulate.21 But in other chapters, Ecuador is identified as one 
of nine countries that since 2010 have exhibited a ‘significant downwards shift’ in liberal 
																																																								
15 Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, 2008, Title II, Rights. 
16 Ibid art 71. 
17 Ibid art 11.6. 
18 Ibid art 11.3. 
19 Ibid art11.2. 
20 Kurt Weyland, ‘The Threat from the Populist Left’ (2013) 24 J of Democracy 18; Carlos de la Torre, 
‘Technocratic Populism in Ecuador’ (2013) 24 J of Democracy 33; Steven Levitsky and James Loxton, 
‘Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in the Andes’ (2013) 20 Democratization 107. See also G&H, 
94. 
21 Mark Graber, ‘What’s in Crisis? The Postwar Constitutional Paradigm, Transformative 
Constitutionalism, and the Fate of Constitutional Democracy’ in GLT, 669, at 672. 
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democracy,22 and it is reported that Freedom House classifies Ecuador as one of only 
seven countries that has recently moved from being ‘free’ to ‘unfree’.23 Is Ecuador to be 
admired as a model of constitutional democracy or condemned as an illustration of its 
decay? 
The answer to that question depends in large part on which conception of 
constitutional democracy you adopt. In a classic study of 1962, Giovanni Sartori 
maintained that during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was general 
agreement about the meaning of ‘constitution’. The term designated a charter which 
established ‘a fundamental set of principles, and a correlative institutional arrangement, 
which would restrict arbitrary power and ensure a “limited government”.’24 But over the 
last century there seems no doubt that the garantiste aspect, that which ties the concept to 
the maintenance of individual liberty, has been obscured. Sartori argued that this was due 
to an intensification of the politics of constitution-making, leading to the greater 
prevalence of merely nominal and façade constitutions. Nominal constitutions authorize 
the particular type of governing order established in a regime, whereas façade 
constitutions not only obscure the ways in which political power is actually exercised but 
also replace the garantiste constitution’s educative purpose - an education in liberty - with an 
educative effect, which has a more explicitly ideological character.  
Sartori’s distinction between a garantiste and façade constitution replicates the 
difference between the function of constitutions in the intellectual frameworks of John 
Locke 25  and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 26  The question, then, is whether constitutional 
democracy is designed to restrain government for the better protection of individual 
liberties or whether it should aim to help transform society in order to realize equal 
liberty.  
It is on this unstated question that the Graber, Levinson and Tushnet volume 
equivocates. Ginsburg and Huq, in contrast, are quite clear: they see President Correa’s 
constitutional reforms ‘as an opening gambit in a process of democratic erosion’, a 
																																																								
22 Zachary Elkins, ‘Is the Sky Falling? Constitutional Crises in Historical Perspective’ in GLT, 49 at 58. 
23 Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z Huq, ‘Defining and Tracking the Trajectory of Liberal Constitutional 
Democracy’ in GLT, 29 at 38. 
24 Giovanni Sartori, ‘Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion’ (1962) 56 Amer Pol Sci Rev 853, at 855. 
25 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (first published, 1690), § 222: ‘The Reason why Men enter into 
Society, is the preservation of their Property; and the end why they chuse and authorize a Legislature is, 
that there may be Laws made, and Rules set as Guards and Fence to the Properties of all the Members of 
the Society, to limit the Power, and moderate the Dominion of every Part and Member of the Society.’  
26 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (first published, 1762), I 9: ‘the fundamental pact … 
substitutes a moral and legitimate equality for whatever physical inequality nature may have placed between 
men, and that while they may be unequal in force or in genius, they all become equal by convention and by 
right.’ 
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process that included removal of ‘more than half the members of Congress’.27 Making 
use of the special methods of a constituent assembly became in this instance the means 
by which the legislative branch of the state could be bypassed.28 Ginsburg and Huq come 
down firmly on the Lockean side, on what they call ‘liberal constitutional democracy’.29 
But in so doing, do they capture only one dimension of modern constitutional 
democracy? 
 
3. The Hollowing Out of Constitutional Democracy 
 
Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? may equivocate on its conception of the regime but its 
component studies have the singular virtue of presenting compelling evidence of the 
factors that are hollowing out the established institutions of constitutional democracy.  
One commonly offered explanation for this trend concerns the impact of 
globalization. The rapid expansion in global trade, investment, technology and 
communication networks has led to the creation of transnational regulatory institutions 
whose rule systems have reduced the capacity of states to regulate their own economies. 
A rapidly growing transnational institutional network is eroding constitutional democracy 
in two main ways. First, the rule systems are operated by officials who are insulated from 
established constitutional methods of control and accountability. Secondly, rule systems 
are often explicitly designed to protect market arrangements from political interference. 
By virtue of their design and mode of operation, these transnational developments 
indicate the degree to which the activity of governing now functions at some remove 
from the original ideals of national self-determination.  
																																																								
27 G&H, 94 
28 G&H, 144. 
29 Ginsburg & Huq are, however, more nuanced on the legacy of the New Deal. They state (G&H, 128-9): 
‘To some, the New Deal was a constitutional coup of such depth and such a radical character that it 
robbed us of the framers’ legacy. … On the one hand are those who see the modern administrative state 
that emerged from the New Deal as a necessary and essentially beneficial response to changes in the 
economic and social pressures on the nation. … On the other hand, however, are those on the American 
right today who perceive the New Deal as a betrayal of the original Constitution and the source of what 
President Trump calls a “civilizational threat” of “the creep of government bureaucracy”. The New Deal, 
however, does not meet our definition of democratic erosion. … [It] did not mark a complete rupture in 
institutional developments … we do not think that the New Deal satisfies our definition of erosion, 
because it is not characterized by substantive negative change in any of the three institutional predicates of 
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Some scholars argue that this trend expresses the hegemony of liberalism over 
democracy. 30  But others maintain that these transnational arrangements impose a 
discipline on nation-states that compensates for deficiencies at the national level. Ordo-
liberals, for example, claim that transnational regimes can impose what is in effect an 
economic constitution on states, able to strengthen the liberal constitutional values of 
limited government and individual liberty.31 It is beyond question that the operation of 
global capital markets leads to a certain loss of capacity at the national level. But whether 
this weakens or strengthens constitutional democracy depends on whether you prioritise 
classical constitutionalism or representative democracy. The ambivalence of 
constitutional democracy is again obvious. 
 There is one aspect of globalization on which all seem to agree: that it reinforces 
the hollowing out of domestic institutions. Constitutional democracy is erected on the 
assumption that the legislature, as the primary vehicle of electoral representation, has a 
pivotal role,32 yet the persistent trend has been for legislatures to be conceding authority 
to governments, regulatory officials and courts. Such concessions drastically erode the 
principle of representation, bolstering a conviction that the institutional apparatus of 
government is now a self-perpetuating system in no need elected representatives. If the 
governmental machinery in Belgium and Spain (and lately in Northern Ireland) can 
operate for long periods without representative and responsible ministers, many may 
think representative democracy is now of limited value. 
Just as legislatures have been weakened, so too are political parties. Organized as 
vehicles for the formation of democratic will, they are felt to be remote from their 
members and beholden to powerful backers. Political parties are now often perceived as 
mechanisms that function to manage supporters’ expectations rather than channelling 
their collective will. Since constitutional democracy requires a stable political party system 
that provides for partisan contestation within a rule-based framework of government and 
																																																								
30 See, eg, David Schneiderman, ‘Disabling Constitutional Capacity: Global Economic Law and 
Democratic Decline’ in GLT, 551. Schneiderman notes (at 562-3) that this is one reason why Ecuador 
after 2008 revised its investment treaty policies. 
31 See, eg, Wilhelm Röpke, ‘Interdependence of Domestic and International Economic Systems’ (first 
published, 1951) in Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (eds), Germany’s Social Market Economy: Origins and 
Evolution (Macmillan, 1989), ch 5. 
32 See Samuel Issacharoff, ‘Populism versus Democratic Governance’ in GLT, 445 at 450: ‘the premise of 
modern constitutional democracy is the primacy of the legislative branch’. 
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opposition, this development also weakens the authority of this type of governing 
regime. 33  
The impact of these various trends is reflected in the decline in electoral 
participation rates over the last thirty years.34 It might once have been possible to claim 
this as proof of satisfaction with the system, but disengagement is now combined with a 
growing polarization in political views. Graphically displayed in the fixed nature of red-
blue electoral maps in the US and UK, a high degree of political polarization now 
threatens to destroy the common sentiment that binds together the political nation. 
Almost a century ago, Arthur Balfour asserted that the British ‘political machinery 
presupposes a people so fundamentally at one that they can safely afford to bicker; and 
so sure of their own moderation that they are not dangerously disturbed by the never-
ending din of political conflict’.35 This is far from the case today, signified by the waning 
in authority of the informal norms and practices that convey the essential values of a 
common constitutional culture.36  
The prospect across the political landscape of Europe is now evident. We see it 
in the decline in the fortunes of almost all established political parties, and especially 
those promoting social democracy.37 With the centre no longer holding, the void is being 
filled by emerging popular movements. They express a variety of political convictions, 
but what seems most clearly to define what is now commonly labelled ‘populism’ is its 
antagonism to most varieties of constitutional democracy.38 Claiming to express the 
																																																								
33 Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (Harper & Row, 1942); EE Schattschneider, 
Party Government  (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1942), 1: ‘political parties created democracy … modern 
democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties’. 
34 See World Development Report 2017, Governance and the Law (The World Bank, 2017), 228, showing that 
over the last 25 years the average global voter turnout rate dropped by more than 10 per cent. See further, 
Voter Turnout Database: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout 
35 AJ Balfour ‘Introduction’ to Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (OUP, 1928), xxiv. 
36 It might be noted that the institutional skew given to constitutional democracy in the works under 
review is illustrated by the fact that the GLT editors suggest that while the UK is a democracy it ‘may not 
be’ a constitutional democracy: GLT at 8. 
37 Peter Mair, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing Out of Western Democracy (Verso, 2013), 1: ‘The age of party 
democracy has passed.’ For a more nuanced analysis see: Carolien van Ham, Jacques Thomassen, Kees 
Aarts, and Rudy Andeweg, Myth and Reality of the Legitimacy Crisis: Explaining Trends and Cross-National 
Differences in Established Democracies (OUP, 2017), 80: ‘In combination it seems the omens are not good: the 
future for parties does not seem too bright. Fewer of us are party members; fewer of us vote in elections; 
of those of us who do vote we are more inconsistent in our voting behaviour - though curiously perhaps 
we are still inclined to show some loyalty in our attachment to particular parties… But before we write the 
obituary for political parties as a species, it is worth reflecting on a few things, the first of these being the 
fact that we’ve been here before.’ 
38 See Jan-Werner Müller, What is Populism? (Penguin, 2017), arguing that populism’s main claim is a 
rejection of pluralism. Cf Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (Verso, 2005), x: ‘in the dismissal of populism 
far more is involved than the relegation of a peripheral set of phenomena to the margins of social 
explanation. What is involved in such a disdainful rejection is, I think, the dismissal of politics tout court, and 
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authentic voice of the people, populists are critical of constitutional devices that filter 
majority views through such institutional sieves as electoral colleges, unelected second 
chambers, expert commissions, judicial scrutiny mechanisms, and transnational 
networks. These, they assert, are methods by which political elites preserve their power 
in the face of majority will. The influence of such movements has grown as a direct 
response to three contemporary themes: growing economic inequality, mass migration, 
and the consequent difficulty of maintaining a secular civic space. 
As Thomas Piketty and others have shown, economic inequality has been rapidly 
rising across advanced economies.39 In both the US and the UK, for example, the 
earnings of the top 1 per cent as a proportion of national income has more than doubled 
over the last forty years (and now reaches 20% and 14% respectively). 40  Extreme wealth 
imbalance raises constitutional issues by undermining the common feeling that sustains 
republican government, not just because of the corrosive influence of economic power 
being converted into political power (through lobbying and regulatory capture) but also 
through a growing sense that the wealthy no longer see themselves as part of a 
territorially-bounded political nation. That the interests of ordinary people are being 
ignored is not unfounded. 41   But once again the critical question is whether this 
development has been caused by the erosion of constitutional democracy or by its 
evolution. A regime captured by wealthy elites is not a constitutional democracy; it is at 
best an oligarchy, at worst a plutocracy. 42 On the other hand, the fact that the US, the 
world’s first modern constitutional democracy, also has one of the highest ratios of 
income inequality in the advanced world may not be coincidental.  
It is not just growing economic inequality; the impact that demographic change is 
having on the homogeneous character of ‘the people’ is crucial. Unprecedented levels of 
migration, especially in Europe and North America, have created a more fragmented 
sense of the demos, which loosens the ‘common sympathies’ that sustain constitutional 
democracies.43 The problem is not intolerance of difference as such. Intolerance becomes 
																																																																																																																																																														
the assertion that the management of community is the concern of an administrative power whose source 
of legitimacy is a proper knowledge of what a “good” community is.’ 
39 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty First Century A Goldhammer trans (Belknap Press, 2014), Pt III. 
40 Ganesh Sitaraman, ‘Economic Inequality and Constitutional Democracy’ in GLT, 533 at 534. 
41 Desmond King and Rogers M Smith, ‘Populism, Racism, and the Rule of Law in Constitutional 
Democracies Today’ in GLT, 459, at 467. 
42 Sitaraman, above n.40 at 538. 
43 T Alexander Aleinikoff, ‘Inherent Instability: Immigration and Constitutional Democracies’ in GLT, 477 
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a political issue only when conditions permit its open expression, and it becomes 
destructive of constitutional democracy only when it is endorsed by political leaders. 44  
But these conditions may now be materialising, fuelling the rise of a type of politics 
signified by the adoption of Australia’s boat ban, Trump’s ‘America First’ policy and the 
EU’s ‘Fortress Europe’.  
In such political circumstances, it is difficult to maintain a common civic space 
for deliberative action. That challenge is exacerbated by the rise of fundamentalist 
religious movements with a very particular sense of majority will. The effort to maintain 
a pluralist civic space in the face of such movements has been intensely felt in such 
regimes as Erdoğan’s Turkey, Modi’s India, Netanyahu’s Israel, and Kaczyński’s Poland. 
It is a palpable tension in constitutional democracies such as India and the US, which 
despite maintaining a formal separation of church and state are among the world’s most 
religious societies. 45   Whatever else it may stand for, constitutional democracy is 
commonly understood to be founded on a crucial distinction between matters public and 
matters private, with questions of religious truth being largely relegated to the private 
sphere so that the pluralist, secular public sphere can flourish.46 These movements are 
now either weakening the authority of that civic space or transforming it from one that 
accommodates difference to one that gives voice to a singular type of ‘truth’. 
Signs that the institutional forms of constitutional authority are now being widely 
challenged are there for anyone prepared to look. In the US, corporate power corrupts 
the republic. In Turkey, the power of Islam erodes its secular constitutional foundations. 
In Hungary, the rapid adoption of neo-liberal policies after communism leads to a 
resurgence of nationalism. In Ecuador, economic and political conditions stifle the 
emancipatory potential of its constitutional values. In South Africa, the failure to build a 
functional democratic institutional infrastructure erodes post-Apartheid ideals. In Israel, 
immigration policies stretch to breaking point its ambiguous foundation as a ‘Jewish and 
democratic’ state. These are serious issues, but it surely is not enough simply to hold up 
‘constitutional democracy’ as the ideal of enlightened government against which 
symptoms of degeneration can be measured. Since constitutional democracy remains a 
contested concept, any inquiry into the contemporary crises facing nation-states must 
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also consider the ambivalent role that constitutions have come to play in trying to hold 
them together.  
 
4. Methods of Constitutional Erosion 
 
The trends of the last decade have renewed scholarly interest in the institutional 
conditions of national stability and prosperity. In Why Nations Fail, Acemoglu and 
Robinson argued that countries prosper only when the state is able to maintain law and 
order, provide the essential physical and social infrastructure, and protect market 
interactions, and that for these conditions to be met the state must be controlled by its 
citizens rather than be the preserve of a small political elite.47 In How Democracies Die, 
Levitsky and Ziblatt explained that democracies acquire authoritarian features when 
political actors reject the democratic rules of the game, deny the legitimacy of opponents, 
tolerate or encourage violence, and curtail the civil liberties of opponents.48 Ginsburg and 
Huq contribute to this growing body of institutionalist literature by focusing on the 
mechanisms through which constitutional erosion takes place. 
 Noting that between 1960 and 1989 there were 145 successful coups whereas 
since 1989 there have been only 36,49 they maintain that violent revolution is not much 
of a threat to established constitutional democracies: ‘the coup and the emergency regime 
change are yesterday’s instruments against democracy’. 50  That is, constitutional 
democracies are being degraded rather than overthrown. Ginsburg and Huq note that, 
unlike overthrow, erosion is incremental rather than immediate. Significantly, whereas 
overthrow involves rupture in legal continuity, erosion is commonly effected through 
existing legal powers.  Erosion, then, involves the use of legal powers to achieve a 
gradual deterioration in the three basic institutional predicates of constitutional 
democracy: electoral competition, basic rights of expression and association, and the 
integrity of institutions. 
 Ginsburg and Huq identify five methods by which existing legal powers can be 
used to erode constitutional democracies. These are measures to amend the constitution, 
to eliminate or weaken existing constitutional checks, to strengthen executive power, to 
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weaken civil society organisations, and to suppress party competition.51 The use of such 
measures varies according to circumstance, but the general orientation of change is anti-
pluralist leading to the consolidation of the power of charismatic politicians claiming to 
be the authentic representatives of a non-institutionalised notion of ‘the people’. The 
most important point is that the social and political forces which give expression to these 
authoritarian tendencies emerge from within, rather than outside, the existing structures 
of constitutional democracy. 
 A good illustration of the use of these methods is seen in the case of Hungary. 
Making the transition to constitutional democracy after 1989, Hungary had 
simultaneously ‘to establish an independent nation-state, a civil society, a private 
economy, and a democratic structure’.52 This was not achieved without controversy and 
in 2010 the electorate expressed its dissatisfaction with the reforms by voting Viktor 
Orbán’s centre-right Fidesz Party into government. However, because of an electoral 
provision designed to prevent fragmentation, Fidesz won 53 per cent of the vote but 
acquired 68 per cent of the legislative seats. It was therefore able to use its two-thirds 
majority to amend the constitution. There followed a raft of new laws and constitutional 
amendments ‘changing the shape of virtually every political institution in Hungary and 
making the guarantee of constitutional rights less secure’. 53  Since the activism of 
Hungary’s Constitutional Court had been of particular concern, the new constitution 
both limited its jurisdiction and enlarged its composition, while also establishing a 
National Judicial Office that controlled case selection and assignment. These reforms 
enabled Fidesz in effect to dictate the courts’ mode of operations, thereby undermining 
the independence of a key institution of constitutional democracy. 54  
 Elsewhere, we see variations on this pattern. In Poland, with its higher threshold 
for constitutional amendment, the independence of its Constitutional Tribunal could not 
be compromised by constitutional reform but was nevertheless undermined by a series 
of legislative changes.55 In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez used the device of a referendum to 
authorize the establishment of a constituent assembly which, claiming to possess 
sovereign legal authority, ‘closed the Congress, purged the judiciary, and gutted the 
electoral bureaucracy’. 56  In Russia, Vladimir Putin, faced with a term limit on his 
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presidency, ‘simply arranged for a constitutional amendment that would strengthen the 
powers of the prime minister, an office he duly occupied for a term’ and then in 2012 
returned to the presidency.57 
 Ginsburg and Huq offer many illustrations of the ways in which these various 
methods have been used to convert constitutional democracy into ‘charismatic 
populism’,58 or to bring about ‘partisan degradation’.59 They present compelling evidence 
from across the world that these methods are seriously depleting institutions of what 
might be called ‘counter-democratic’ accountability, 60  suppressing oppositional 
movements in civil society or political parties, and bolstering the governing party’s 
powers of rule. Constitutional democracies are being converted into ‘illiberal 
democracies’ or ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’, that is, regimes in which ‘party 
rotation in power is no longer a genuine possibility’.61 
 
5. Methods of Constitutional Protection 
 
Although there is an extensive literature of political science on the relative advantages of 
presidential or parliamentary systems of government, it tends to be orientated towards 
effectiveness rather than questioning which is most able to protect constitutional 
democracies against erosion. Focusing on this latter question, Ginsburg and Huq argue 
that parliamentary systems are to be preferred. They are to be favoured because they are 
more responsive to shifting political conditions, can more easily jettison bad leaders, and 
they provide more effective arrangements for ‘maintaining accountability and checking 
efforts at charismatic populism and partisan degradation’.62 Parliamentary systems, in 
short, are less susceptible to collapse into authoritarian modes of governing.  
With this concern in mind, Ginsburg and Huq examine a range of possibilities in 
the design of constitutions. They are sceptical of the value of the most widely discussed 
device, that is, the adoption of repressive measures to safeguard constitutional 
democracies from internal threats. Commonly presented under the banner of ‘militant 
democracy’,63 they argue that such constitutional measures as party bans, prohibitions on 
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office-holding and curbs on free speech are ‘too dependent on the model of the Nazi 
ascent to power to capture the range of ways in which more mainstream parties today 
turn to erosion as a means of remaining in power’.64 Since such mechanisms threaten the 
rights of association fundamental to constitutional democracy, they are potentially 
counter-productive and, even if they may occasionally be necessary, they can never be 
sufficient. 
 Edmund Burke famously maintained that a constitution without the means of 
change is without the means of its conservation.65 But if a constitution can be too easily 
amended then it cannot realize the essential objective of providing conditions for 
stabilizing the state’s basic governing framework. This is a key dilemma of constitutional 
design. One solution, now commonly adopted in constitutions, is to entrench essential 
core principles within the constitution. 66 And where this technique is not instituted, 
judicially-created equivalents, such as India’s basic structure doctrine, have often been 
devised.67 Ginsburg and Huq accept that such techniques can provide ‘no fail-safe against 
erosion’.68 While noting that courts have occasionally performed a vital role in protecting 
constitutional democracy,69 they also highlight the danger that this ‘can perversely raise 
the stakes in political battles over who controls the courts’.70 Their general message is 
that although a broad range of institutional safeguards from multiple-staged threshold 
voting arrangements to the extending network of arms-length checking institutions may 
exist, ultimately there are no ideal design solutions that can safeguard constitutional 
democracies. 
 Ginsburg and Huq examine one final set of protective measures which, given 
their conception of constitutional democracy, is surprising. The various institutional 
devices they examine are mechanisms that, designed to curb the will of transient 
majorities, are essentially ‘counter-democratic’ techniques. But the last set of proposals 
																																																																																																																																																														
analysis in the context of the ECtHR ruling in Rafah Partisi (the Welfare Party) v Turkey (2001) 35 EHHR 3, 
see: Patrick Macklem, ‘Militant Democracy, Legal Pluralism, and Self-Determination’ (2006) 4 Int J of Con 
Law 488. 
64 G&H, 171. 
65 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (first published, 1790. CC O’Brien ed Penguin, 1968), 
106. 
66 G&H, 174: ‘two-thirds of the constitutions now in force contain some such entrenching clause’.  See 
further, Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers (OUP, 2017), 
ch 1. 
67 Rozani, ibid ch 2. 
68 G&H, 174. 
69 Ginsburg & Huq offer the illustration of the role of the Colombian Constitutional Court’s ruling in 2010 
that President Uribe’s proposed constitutional amendment, which would have permitted him to stand for a 
third term, was unconstitutional as ‘an example of a Constitutional Court almost single-handedly saving 
constitutional democracy’: G&H, 188. 
70 G&H, 174. 
	 18	
they address implicitly acknowledges the limitations of one of their basic predicates of 
constitutional democracy: the holding of free and fair elections. Drawing on what Van 
Reybrouck calls ‘democratic fatigue syndrome’, 71  Ginsburg and Huq explore the 
possibilities of reinvigorating constitutional democracies by devising alternatives to 
voting and supplements to periodic elections. These include the use of citizens’ 
assemblies, participatory budgeting methods and the exploitation of new learning and 
communicating technologies.72 This is a surprising inclusion because Van Reybrouck’s 
basic thesis is that although people may approve of constitutional democracy in theory, 
they are increasingly rejecting it in practice. And he argues that the main reason for 
withdrawing their participation is that the democratic component of constitutional 
democracy is today limited to a device – periodic elections – that, having initially been 
devised as a counter-democratic mechanism, expresses a rather emaciated conception of 
democracy.73 Ginsburg and Huq are therefore forced to conclude, implicitly at least, on 
the ambivalent note that constitutional democracy does not simply need saving; some of 
its basic predicates may also need to be re-examined.  
 
6. The Prospect for Constitutional Democracy 
 
The two books under review together present the most comprehensive evaluation 
available on the current state of constitutional democracy. Their analyses lead inexorably 
to the conclusion that the prospect is not favourable. Measured against the economic, 
social and cultural conditions of the flourishing of this type of regime, contemporary 
trends are imposing severe strains on its mode of operation. Instead of democracy being 
widened and deepened, the signs are that widening economic inequalities and a 
deepening gulf between the political elites and those they represent are eroding the 
sources of legitimacy on which the viability of the regime rests. Assessed in those terms, 
constitutional democracy is indeed in a critical condition, not least because a regime that 
holds out the promise of the individual’s liberation from authoritarian rule is now widely 
perceived to be operating in a remote and unresponsive manner. 
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 Scholars have often speculated that the trend towards democracy is a natural 
evolution attributable to ‘a general law of social progress’.74 This type of approach is now 
widely discredited. Constitutional democracy is to be examined in a more objective 
manner by regarding it as a specific aspect of general processes of rationalization which 
are indicative of modernity.75 This is especially the case when, as with the two books 
under review, the role of documentary constitutions – rather than an absolute concept of 
the constitution of the state76 – is stressed. The establishment of a modern constitution 
commonly signifies the replacement of a governing regime shaped by ‘accident and 
force’ with one determined by ‘reflection and choice’.77 But if we look at the standing of 
constitutional democracy as an index of the extending rationalization of modern political 
life today, then perhaps the critical question becomes: how has a technique designed to 
enhance human freedom by regulating political action through ‘higher-order’ law come 
to be so widely experienced as imposing constraints on freedom? The question of the 
contemporary crisis of constitutional democracy is, it would appear, situated at the 
crossroads where Weber’s thesis on rationalization meets Marx’s concept of alienation.78  
 Recognizing that the principle of equality was an inexorable feature of modernity, 
constitutional democracy seems to have been originally devised as a regime that, in the 
face of an emerging democratic temperament, held out the best prospect of maintaining 
the aristocratic basis of governing and protecting the order of property. The solution 
entailed conceiving democracy mainly as requiring the periodic election of 
representatives whose role was not so much to express the will of the people as to ‘refine 
and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of 
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country’.79  The 
institutional framework to bolster it, of necessity an accommodation with established 
power-holders,80 would then be policed by lawyers who ‘are attached to public order 
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beyond every other consideration’ and who ‘if they prize freedom much, they generally 
value legality still more’.81 
The ambition and ambiguity of modern constitutional documents is remarkable. 
Drafted in the name of the people, they present themselves as instruments of settlement, 
whilst incorporating multiple techniques of evasion.82 They speak in the name of unity 
(‘we the people’), notwithstanding the fact that they are invariably the outcomes of a 
crisis in which some celebrate victory but others experience defeat. Expressing a new 
chapter in a nation’s history, they face the future and hold up the promise of ‘a more 
perfect union’ at the same time bolstering their authority by drawing on mythical national 
history. Modern constitutions present themselves as simple instruments for organizing 
government, but to fulfill their purpose they increasingly are being invested with some 
sacred redemptive quality. 
This tension between their instrumental and symbolic dimensions has been 
heightened by the shifting role of constitutions over the last century. With the defeat of 
fascism and the collapse of socialism, the construction known as constitutional 
democracy has been fashioned as the principal vehicle through which the last major 
ideology of modern times is advanced. It has therefore also become the battleground for 
what remains of political contestation. Within this struggle, any political movement that 
challenges the legitimacy of the structures of constitutional democracy is now given a 
generic label. Whether the contest comes from the left through such movements as 
Syriza in Greece or Podemos in Spain, the right as in Italy’s Lega Nord or the Dutch 
Freedom Party (PVV), or from religiously-based nationalist movements like India’s 
Hindutva or Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), the challengers are 
invariably called ‘populist’. This has now become one of the major political issues of our 
times, but if the contemporary crisis of constitutional democracy is to be fully grasped, 
then causes leading to the emergence of these movements need investigation, rather than 
their manifestation being the subject of denigration.   
The books under review do address some of these causes. In his study of 
Hungary, Gábor Halmai recognizes that Fidesz was responding to an over-ambitious 
exercise in constitutional renewal during the post-1989 period, spearheaded by a 
Constitutional Court that advanced an ‘invisible constitution’ containing ideal standards 
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of constitutionality beyond the textual Constitution.83 He notes that before the 2010 
elections ‘the majority of voters were already dissatisfied not only with the government, 
but also with the transition itself’.84 Examining the reasons why Hungary turned away 
from liberal constitutionalism, he explains that authoritarianism, including pre-1939 
arrangements, has always played a deeper role in governing the Hungarian state and that, 
whereas constitutional democracy values ‘secularism, cosmopolitanism, autonomy and 
rationality’, Hungarians continue to emphasize ‘religion, national pride, obedience, and 
respect for authority’. 85 These factors, together with growing economic inequalities, 
relatively poor economic growth, and the adoption of a ‘legalistic form constitutionalism’ 
that reduces ‘the Constitution to an elite instrument’, 86  go a considerable way to 
indicating why in 2010, in the words of Kim Scheppele, Hungarians ‘voted for the one 
conventional party that remained standing’.87 From this emerges a more complicated 
picture than what Ginsburg and Huq call a model case of ‘democratic erosion’,88 not least 
because the fact that Fidesz has retained clear majorities in both the 2014 and 2018 
elections may indicate a crisis of liberalism rather than of democracy.   
The basic point is that if constitutional democracy is in a critical state, solutions 
are unlikely to be found by focusing only on ways of strengthening liberal institutions. 
Remedies must be considered that take seriously the need to reinvigorate democratic 
aspirations. Yet much of the analysis in these two books seems content to rest its 
account of democracy on the mechanism of voting, making it easy to highlight its 
manifest limitations and to skew the remedy towards reinvigorating the authority of 
institutions of counter-democratic rule. We do not need to be in the thrall of false 
polarities to recognize that the values of liberalism and democracy have different 
orientations that are not easily reconciled within constitutional democracy. A more 
balanced appraisal might therefore enquire into the evident deficiencies of the workings 
of many counter-democratic institutions and take seriously a conception of democracy as 
a social and cultural practice rather than a mere mechanism for choosing leaders.  
There is nothing new in this appraisal. At the end of his second volume on 
Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that although equality of condition is a 
providential fact of modernity it is up to us to determine ‘whether the principle of 
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equality is to lead … to servitude or freedom, to knowledge or barbarism, to prosperity 
or to wretchedness’.89 The freedom Tocqueville held up as a cardinal virtue was not 
freedom from political engagement. He was alert to the danger that the equalization of 
conditions might cause individuals to retreat to their own private worlds and neglect the 
civic virtues sustaining social interdependence. Above all, freedom for Tocqueville meant 
collective self-government. If constitutional democracy is to continue to provide the 
authoritative framework through which we contest political questions, Tocqueville’s 
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